The nightmare of a repeat of the tragedies of World War II in Europe is closer to Europe than ever before, and Eastern European countries are deeply concerned about the inability of the United States and NATO to support them against Russia. If Russia achieves its political goals in Ukraine by military means, Europe ,mainly the eastern part, will not remain what it was before the war. Any feeling that the European Union or NATO can guarantee peace on the continent will be the artifact of a lost era.
Overview
Ukraine is located in the southwest of the Russian Federation as a gateway to Russia to the west. This country is of vital importance to Russia in the first peripheral circle; because this country can easily be used to besiege Russia. Hence, it is of great strategic importance to Russia. On the other hand, by gaining access to Crimea, Russia can not only use it as a logistical base to equip its navy, but can also use it to gain control over the Mediterranean Sea to strengthen Syria and even the Middle East region.
If Russia gains control of Ukraine or can destabilize it on a large scale, a new era will begin for the United States and Europe. The US and European leaders will face the dual challenge of reconsidering European security and avoiding a bigger war with Russia. All sides must consider the potential of armed nuclear enemies in a direct confrontation.
The two responsibilities – resolutely defending European peace and cautiously avoiding escalating military tensions with Russia – are not necessarily compatible. The United States and its allies may find themselves deeply unprepared to establish a new European security order as a result of Russian military action in Ukraine.
Europe: The end of a secure paradise?
The peaceful atmosphere that prevailed in Europe after the end of the Cold War and paved the way for the rise of the European Union and political and economic convergence and the transition to national security problems is changing with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the withdrawal of Europe’s largest defense power, Britain. The security paradise that has ruled Europe for nearly three decades, allowing European governments to focus on economic and technical development, regardless of national security concerns, is gradually fading.
Russia has gone beyond interfering in the elections and strengthening the far right and the NATO verbal threat, and has violated Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty. Ukraine, once a powerful Soviet republic during the Cold War and playing a key role in balancing strategic forces with Europe, sought to move closer to the West and join the European Union and NATO after the Soviet Union collapse and along with Georgia became a serious Moscow security concern.
Inclination to the US
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will make European security more dependent on the United States than ever in the last three decades, and later on Britain, the Anglo-Saxon axis; something that is not pleasant for France, Germany and Italy. Perhaps the existence of a common enemy called Russia will strengthen NATO’s internal cohesion and put aside its differences; but in the current context, one cannot expect NATO to return to its heyday in the 1990s and 2000s, or the European Union to be able to secure itself independently by forming a European army; because the liberal international order that NATO and the European Union have come up with is fundamentally weak and declining, neither the United States wants to pay for it nor Europe can afford it.
It is now clear that this order has not been able to prevent Russian security threats and curb Chinese power. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will increase Moscow’s dependence on Beijing so that Moscow can withstand Western sanctions, which is in China’s interest.
Who is bigger loser?
But Europe is undoubtedly the biggest loser in the Ukraine crisis. Europe’s inability to defend its borders against Russia and its inability to uphold the fundamental values of Europe and liberal democracy have exposed Europe’s weakness in the current order; at the same time, if Russia fails to meet its demands in Ukraine quickly and declares its decisive victory, the situation for Putin will become more complicated. Putin‘s political credibility depends largely on his performance in the Ukraine crisis. Blowing up the excitement of the Ukraine issue and turning it into a vital issue for his credibility, he has entered a war for which there is currently no clear end. It is true that the liberal international order has weakened, but it has collapsed, so the United States and Britain, which have seceded from the European Union, will not easily allow Putin to win the battlefield in Ukraine and make Slavic nationalism the mainstream political movement in Eastern Europe.
If Putin easily implements his plan in Ukraine, he will form an important geopolitical belt from the border of China to Central Asia and the Caucasus and the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, sounding the death knell of the liberal international order and establishing himself as the third pole of power in the future.
Different dimensions of Putin’s victory
For Russia, victory in Ukraine can take many forms. Like Syria, victory should not lead to a lasting settlement of the conflict. This could require the establishment of a compatible government in Kyiv or the disintegration of the country. On the other hand, the failure of the Ukrainian army and the negotiation of the surrender of Ukraine can effectively turn Ukraine into a failed country. Russia can also use destructive cyber-attacks and misinformation tools, with the support of the threat of force, to paralyze the country and bring about regime change. With each of these results, Ukraine will be virtually separated from the West.
The Kremlin’s domination of Kyiv is transforming Europe
If Russia achieves its political goals in Ukraine by military means, Europe will not remain what it was before the war. Any feeling that the European Union or NATO can guarantee peace on the continent will be the artifact of a lost era.
Instead, security in Europe must be reduced to defending key members of the European Union and NATO. Everyone outside the clubs except Finland and Sweden will stand alone. This may not necessarily be a conscious decision to end expansionist policies. But this policy will work in practice. Under siege by Russia, the European Union and NATO will no longer have the capacity for ambitious policies beyond their borders.
The United States and Europe will be in a state of constant economic war with Russia. The West will seek to impose extensive sanctions, which, given its economic asymmetry, Russia is likely to crack down on cyber-measures and energy blackmail. China may side with Russia in this economic competition. Meanwhile, domestic politics in European countries will be like a great game of the 21st century, in which Russia will examine Europe for any failure in its commitment to NATO and transatlantic relations.
Russia uses every opportunity to influence public opinion and elections in European countries through unfair and incorrect methods. Russia will have a chaotic presence in every instance of European political instability – sometimes real, sometimes imaginary.
Fundamental differences with the Cold War atmosphere
Comparisons of the Cold War in the world with Ukraine solved in Russia will not be useful. The borders of the Cold War in Europe had their sensitive points, but they were established in an acceptable and reciprocal way in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. In contrast, Russian rule in Ukraine will open up a wide range of instability and insecurity, from Estonia to Poland to Romania and Turkey. As long as Russia’s presence in Ukraine continues, it will be provoked and unacceptable by Ukraine’s neighbors and seen by some as a threat to its security.
In the midst of this changing dynamic, order in Europe must be considered primarily militarily, which, since Russia has a stronger military hand than the economic one, will benefit the Kremlin and marginalize civilian institutions such as the European Union.
If Russia wins Ukraine, Germany‘s position in Europe will be severely challenged. Germany is a marginal military power whose post-war political identity is based on the rejection of war. The circle of friends with which he surrounds himself, especially in the east with Poland and the Baltic states, is threatened by the risk of destabilization by Russia. France and Britain will take the lead in European affairs due to their relatively strong armies and long tradition of military intervention. However, the key player in Europe will remain the United States. NATO, like the troubled and endangered countries of Eastern Europe, will be dependent on US support for frontline countries along a very large, extensive, and uncertain line of contact with Russia, including Belarus and Russian-controlled parts of Ukraine.
Eastern member states, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania, are likely to deploy a significant number of NATO troops permanently. It is impossible to reject the application of Finland and Sweden to obtain the commitment of Article 5 and to join NATO. In Ukraine, the European Union and NATO will never recognize the new Russian-backed regime created by Moscow. But they will face the same challenge they face in Belarus: imposing sanctions without punishing the country’s population and supporting the needy without having access to them. Some NATO members will step up the insurgency in Ukraine, to which Russia will respond by threatening NATO members.
